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We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products 
and buyers interested in those products. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
game, the platform fully internalizes the network externalities present in the market and firms 
and consumers all participate in the platform with probability one. The monopolist 
intermediary extracts all the economic rents generated in the market, except when firms and 
consumers can trade outside the platform, in which case consumers retain part of the 
economic rents. The market allocation is constraint efficient in the sense that the monopoly 
platform does not introduce distortions over and above those arising from the market power of 
the differentiated product sellers. An increase in the number of retailers increases the amount 
of variety in the platform but at the same time increases competition. As a result, the platform 
lowers the firm fees and raises the consumer charges. In contrast, an increase in the extent of 
product differentiation raises the value of the platform for the consumers but weakens 
competition. In this case, the platform raises both the charge to the consumers and the fee for 
the firms. 
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Two-sided markets are characterized by the existence of two groups of agents which derive gains
from conducting transactions with each other (like for example tenants and landlords) and the
existence of intermediaries that facilitate these transactions (like real state agents). Besides markets
for real state, exhibitions, employment agencies, videogame platforms, internet portals, dating
agencies, magazines, newspapers and journals are other examples of two-sided markets.1
An important characteristic of these environments is that market outcomes depend not only on
the total level of transaction costs jointly faced by the two groups of participants (price level) but
also on the particular allocation of those costs across them (price structure) (Rochet and Tirole
(2006)). Several authors have studied how platform prices relate to the nature of intermediation in
the market. Platform pricing in monopoly settings is examined in Armstrong (2006) and Rochet
and Tirole (2003). Pricing in the presence of competing platforms is studied in various settings,
including those of Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007),
Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) and Rochet and Tirole (2003,
2006).
Most studies adopt a reduced-form approach and thus leave the activity that takes place within
a platform non-modelled. The present study departs from this strategy by explicitly modelling
the interaction between the two groups of participants within the platform. We consider a setting
where a platform’s manager tries to attract to her platform retailers selling diﬀerentiated products
on the one hand and consumers interested in the ﬁrms’ oﬀerings on the other hand. We study how
diﬀerentiated product sellers compete for consumers within the platform, and how the platform’s
manager should price its services to buyers and ﬁrms to maximize its proﬁts. Departing from the
reduced-form approach yields new insights into the nature of platform pricing and market eﬃciency.
In particular, it allows us to examine how the price structure depends on the number of retailers
and the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
There are three types of agent in the economy: a platform, N ﬁrms and a unitary mass of consumers.
In the benchmark model ﬁrms and consumers cannot ﬁnd each other without the platform. The
platform tries to lure ﬁrms and consumers to participate. Its pricing policy consists of an advertising
1See Evans (2003), Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) for an extensive set of examples.
2fee ﬁrms have to pay to exhibit their products and prices, and a subscription fee consumers have to
pay to access product and price information. The interaction between these three types of agents
is modelled via the following two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the platform chooses ﬁrm and
consumer participation fees. In the second stage, a ﬁrm deciding to enter the platform advertises
its product and the price at which it is oﬀered. A consumer who decides to enter the platform
observes the diﬀerent oﬀerings and chooses the one that maximizes his utility.
We ﬁnd that continuation game equilibria with partial agent participation cannot be part of a
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). What happens when ﬁrms and consumers do not participate
surely in the platform is that the elasticity of consumer participation is positive, i.e., the fraction
of subscribing consumers increases in the subscription charge. As a result, the platform has an
incentive to continue to increase its consumer fee until all consumers participate. This result,
which is somewhat surprising, is due to the way network externalities between the two groups of
participants operate. Provided all consumers join the platform, the elasticity of ﬁrm participation is
negative so the platform wishes to continue to lower its ﬁrm fee until every ﬁrm joins with probability
one. In the unique SPE of the game, the platform fully internalizes the network externalities present
in the market, all agents participate with probability one in the platform, and the monopolist
intermediary extracts all the economic rents. The market allocation is not eﬃcient because product
sellers have market power. However, the monopolist intermediary does not introduce distortions
over and above those arising from the market power of the diﬀerentiated product sellers. In an
extension we allow ﬁrms and consumers to trade outside the platform. In this case, consumers
capture a part of the economic rents corresponding to the option value of trading outside the
platform.
As mentioned above, our framework allows for the study of the relationship between platform pricing
structure and the nature of competition in the product market. Both an increase in the number of
retailers and an increase in product diﬀerentiation raise the value of the platform for consumers.
However, the way the platform’s manager adjusts its price structure when there is variation in
the number of participating ﬁrms diﬀers from the case in which there is variation in the degree of
product diﬀerentiation. Indeed, as the number of retailers increases, the products become closer
substitutes from the viewpoint of the consumers and thus ﬁrms’ competition becomes ﬁercer. As a
result, the equilibrium price of the product falls, the platform lowers its ﬁrm fee and increases its
consumer charge. By contrast, an increase in the degree of product diﬀerentiation relaxes ﬁrms’
3competitiveness within the platform. In this case, the equilibrium price of the product increases
and the platform raises its fee for the ﬁrms as well as the price it charges to consumers.
Our paper is a contribution to the literature on intermediation. In the classical literature on in-
termediation, intermediaries “make the market” by choosing input and output prices to maximize
their proﬁts (see Spulber (1999) and the references therein). Some authors have analyzed how
intermediated exchange can arise in competitive search markets (see e.g. Gehrig (1993) and Yavas
(1994, 1996)). This literature has experienced a recent revival in the branch of industrial orga-
nization that studies multi-sided markets. A great deal of this literature has focused on speciﬁc
markets, most notably credit card markets (see Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002) and
Wright (2003, 2004)), the Internet (see Baye and Morgan (2001) and Caillaud and Jullien (2001,
2003)), commercial media markets (see Anderson and Coate (2005), Dukes and Gal-Or (2003a,
2003b) and Dukes (2004)), B2B marketplaces (Belleﬂamme and Toulemonde (2004)) and software
(Hagiu, 2006). Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) present general frameworks
for the study of two-sided markets; Belleﬂamme and Toulemonde (2007) explore the role of intra-
group externalities when launching new platforms, and Nocke, Peitz and Stahl (2007) study the
relation between platform ownership and platform size.2
A common feature of many papers in the two-sided market literature3 is that agents on one side
of the market meet agents on the other side of the market according to an exogenously speciﬁed
matching process. Even though this formulation is useful, it is somewhat incomplete for markets
where one group of agents supplies rival goods to the other side of the market within the platform,
like in exhibitions, fairs, real-state agents, labor agencies, etc. In these kinds of market the nature
of platform pricing inﬂuences the matching process in non-trivial ways so the platform’s manager
has to factor this into its decision making process. Our paper models this interaction explicitly
and it shows how the incentive of the platform’s manager to squeeze more or less one side of the
market relative to the other depends upon the speciﬁc structure of the market –number of retailers
and degree of product diﬀerentiation–. In this sense, our results yield empirical predictions on the
relationship between platform prices and the nature of the activity that takes place within the
platform which, to the best of our knowledge, have not yet been investigated.
2See also the empirical contributions of Rysman (2004) and Kaiser and Wright (2006).
3Baye and Morgan (2001), Belleﬂamme and Toulemonde (2004), Dukes (2004), Nocke, Peitz and Stahl (2007) and
Rochet and Tirole (2002) are notable exceptions.
4The papers most closely related to ours are Baye and Morgan (2001) and Dukes (2004). Baye and
Morgan (2001) study how a monopoly gatekeeper on the internet can attract a share of local trade.
The main diﬀerences between our paper and theirs is that we model markets for diﬀerentiated
products and that in their setting centralized and decentralized trade can coexist. In an extension
of our benchmark model we allow some form of decentralized trade. In contrast to Baye and Morgan
(2001), we ﬁnd that centralized and decentralized trade cannot coexist. Dukes (2004) studies the
private and social provision of advertising in a setting where radio-stations and product sellers oﬀer
diﬀerentiated radio programmes and products to the consumers. An important diﬀerence between
his paper and ours is the modelling of advertising. In his model buyers listen to the radio but dislike
advertisements so there are negative ﬁrms-to-consumers network externalities; by contrast, in our
setting consumers subscribe to the platform in order to receive price and product information so
there exist positive ﬁrms-to-consumers network externalities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our benchmark model. The
analysis and results are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we allow for decentralized trade in the
economy. Finally, section 5 concludes. The proofs of Claims 1 and 2 are relegated to an Appendix.
2 A two-sided market with diﬀerentiated product sellers
We study a two-sided market (platform) controlled by a monopolist where one group of partic-
ipants are ﬁrms selling horizontally diﬀerentiated products and the other group of participants
are consumers interested in those products. The monopoly platform sets its entry fees to attract
both groups of participants to the platform. A ﬁrm entering the platform exhibits its product and
consumers learn about its product’s characteristics and the price at which the product is oﬀered.
Consumers choose among the diﬀerent products on sale at the platform to maximize utility. Let a
denote the (ﬁxed) fee the platform charges the ﬁrms for participation; likewise, let s be the (ﬁxed)
entry fee consumers must pay to participate.4 We normalize ﬁxed and variable cost of the platform
to zero.
On the supply side of the product market there are N ≥ 2 retailers selling a diﬀerentiated product.
The sellers compete in prices. They all produce the good at constant returns to scale and their
4This pricing scheme involving lump-sum fees is reasonable in situations where monitoring transactions is quite
diﬃcult. This happens to be the case in exhibitions, fairs, yellow pages, magazines, newspapers, internet platforms,
etc. See Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) for a discussion of diﬀerent pricing mechanisms.
5identical unit production cost is normalized to zero. Retailers advertise their products and their
prices in the platform. A ﬁrm i may decide to enter the platform or not at all. We represent the
set of pure entry-strategies as Ei = {A,NA}, where A and NA indicate the decisions to enter and
exhibit the product or not to enter at all, respectively. A ﬁrm i’s entry strategy is then a probability
function over the set Ei. We refer to λi as the probability with which a ﬁrm i chooses to enter the
platform and advertise its product, while 1 − λi denotes the probability with which the ﬁrm stays
out of the platform. A ﬁrm i’s pricing strategy is a price pi. A strategy for ﬁrm i is thus denoted
by si = {λi,pi}, i = 1,2,...,N. Let Eπi denote the (expected) payoﬀ to a ﬁrm i.
On the demand side of the market, there is a unit mass of consumers who must subscribe to the
platform to become aware of the characteristics and the prices of the products. A consumer m
is willing to pay εim > 0 for the good of ﬁrm i. The parameter εim represents the quality of the
match between consumer m and product i. We assume that all consumers are identical and that
the matching value is the realization of a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,ε]. Let F(ε)
and f(ε) denote the uniform cumulative and probability distribution functions, respectively. A
buyer demands a maximum of one unit.5 A consumer may decide to subscribe to the platform
or not at all. The set of consumers’ pure strategies is R = {S,NS}, where S and NS indicate
the decisions to subscribe to and not to subscribe to the intermediary, respectively. A consumer’s
mixed strategy is a probability function over the set R. We refer to µ ∈ [0,1] as the probability
with which a consumer enters the platform and Eu denotes the (expected) utility of a consumer.
The timing of moves is as follows. The platform, in the ﬁrst stage of the game, chooses its entry
fee for the ﬁrms and its subscription charge for the consumers to maximize its proﬁts. In the
second stage, after observing the participation fees, ﬁrms simultaneously choose whether to place
ads in the platform or not and which price to charge, while consumers decide whether to enter the
platform or not. Firms and consumers that do not enter the platform cannot conduct transactions.6
The market clears when transactions between ﬁrms and consumers take place. We study subgame
perfect equilibria.7
5The modelling of product diﬀerentiation is in line with Perloﬀ and Salop (1985) and Anderson and Renault
(1999). Although we use the uniform distribution throughout, as shown in Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991), log-concavity
of f implies proﬁt functions are quasi-concave so the results obtained here are arguably more general.
6In Section 4 we relax this assumption and allow ﬁrms and consumers to trade on their own, without the platform
mediation.
7Before proceeding with the analysis, we would like to clarify some technical issues. It is known that the existence
of network externalities often leads to multiple equilibria. In our model there is always a SPE where no ﬁrm and
63 Equilibrium
This section contains our main result. We ﬁrst present the continuation game equilibria. For this,
for any given proﬁle of platform fees, we derive the participation rates of consumers and ﬁrms as
well as the equilibrium in the product market. Then, proceeding by backwards induction, we derive
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
3.1 Continuation game equilibria.
We start by describing the market outcomes in the second stage of the game. Consider the behavior
of a ﬁrm i, that takes as given the platform’s entry fee a ≥ 0, the rivals’ strategies as well as
consumers’ behavior. Let µ ∈ (0,1] be the fraction of consumers subscribing to the platform.
Likewise, assume a ﬁrm believes its rivals will enter the platform with probability λ ∈ (0,1] and
charge a price p∗. Then, the proﬁts a ﬁrm i obtains when entering the platform and charging a
price pi (diﬀerent than p∗ to allow for oﬀ-the-equilibrium pricing) are:









λk(1 − λ)N−1−k Pr[εim − pi ≥ max{0,zkm − p∗}]
#
− a, (1)
where s−i denotes the strategies of ﬁrms other than i, Pr[·] stands for probability and zkm ≡
max{ε1m,ε2m,...,εkm}.
The proﬁts expression in (1) is easily understood. There are µ consumers in the platform and,
if they buy from ﬁrm i, the ﬁrm’s per-consumer proﬁt is pi. Since rival ﬁrms enter the platform
with probability λ, a ﬁrm may ﬁnd itself alone in the platform, which happens with probability
(1 − λ)N−1. In this case the ﬁrm sells to all consumers m who ﬁnd the product-price combination





λ(1 − λ)N−2. If, for example, ﬁrm j is in the platform then ﬁrm i only sell to
a consumer m when εim − pi ≥ εjm − p∗ and εim − pi ≥ 0. The summation captures the cases
where the ﬁrm encounters k = 1,2,...,N −1 rivals in the platform. Since all consumers are ex-ante
identical, we shall drop the subindex m in what follows.
no consumer enters the intermediary. Similarly, one can easily choose strategies to sustain any desired outcome as a
SPE. E.g., to sustain a pair (ˆ a, ˆ s) as a symmetric SPE one can propose a continuation game strategy proﬁle where a
deviation from the prescribed strategy triggers the exit of ﬁrms and consumers from the intermediary. In what follows
we ignore equilibria based on these strategies because they are not robust to standard trembling-hand (perfectness)
arguments.
7The probability that ﬁrm i’s makes a sale to a consumer when k other ﬁrms are advertising their
products in the platform is:
Pr[εi − pi ≥ max{0,zk − p∗}] =
Z ¯ ε
pi
F(εi + p∗ − pi)kf(ε)dε,
where we have used the fact that the distribution of zk is F(ε)k. Given this, we can rewrite the












F(εi + p∗ − pi)kf(ε)dε
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Using the expressions for F and f, taking the ﬁrst order condition with respect to price and applying














Claim 1. There always exists an equilibrium price p∗ which solves equation (3). Furthermore,
p∗ is monotonically decreasing in λ, going from the monopoly price ¯ ε/2 down to a strictly positive







Intuitively, an increase in λ raises the chance a ﬁrm encounters competitors in the platform so
competition fosters and equilibrium price falls. Using (3) in the expression for proﬁts (2), we ﬁnd





Since equilibrium price falls in λ (see claim 1), the proﬁts of the ﬁrms also decrease in λ.
We now turn to the consumer side of the market. Given the strategies of the other participants in
the platform, the expected utility to a joining consumer is











(E[zk|zk ≥ p∗] − p∗ − s), (5)
8where E denotes the expectation operator.
We now explain how equation (5) obtains. Since ﬁrms advertise in the platform with probability
λ, a consumer who enters the platform may encounter no ﬁrm, which happens with probability
(1 − λ)N; in this case, the consumer derives a net utility of −s. The consumer may ﬁnd k ﬁrms




λk(1 − λ)N−k, k = 1,2,...,N. In this case the
consumer derives a surplus given by
uk =

zk − p∗ if zk > p∗
0 otherwise.
This surplus uk has distribution G(uk) = F(uk + p∗)k, 0 ≤ uk ≤ ε − p∗. Therefore the expected
























where the last equality follows from using the uniform distribution. The expression in (5) can then










Claim 2. Eu∗(S) is increasing in λ.
The economic intuition behind this fact is as follows. An increase in λ has two positive eﬀects on
the surplus of a consumer. On the one hand, a higher λ increases ﬁrms’ competition in the platform
and therefore subscribing consumers are able to buy at lower prices. On the other hand, a higher
λ increases the extent of variety in the platform, which in turn increases the expected value of the
typical match between a buyer and a seller.
Equations (3), (4), and (7) allow us to characterize the equilibria in the continuation game. Depend-
ing on the magnitude of the fees charged to the two groups of participants, ﬁrms and consumers
might or might not participate in the market with probability 1. The following result summarizes
the possible equilibria in the continuation game.
9Proposition 1 In the continuation game of the monopoly platform model with diﬀerentiated prod-
uct sellers there may be two kinds of symmetric equilibrium.
I. An equilibrium with full consumer participation (µ∗ = 1) and either full or partial ﬁrm par-
ticipation (λ∗ ≤ 1). In this type of equilibrium ﬁrms charge a price p∗ given by the solution





II. An equilibrium with partial consumer participation (µ∗ < 1) and either full or partial ﬁrm





and when λ∗ < 1 it is given by the solution to
N X
k=1
B(k|λ,n)E[uk] = s. (10)
3.2 Subgame perfect equilibrium.
We now move to the ﬁrst stage of the game. The monopoly platform, anticipating the equilibria









λk(1 − λ)N−kka + µs = Nλa + µs. (11)
We ﬁrst show that a SPE with partial participation of the agents does not exist. Suppose that at the
equilibrium fees (a,s) both groups of participants mix between participating and not participating
in the continuation game. Then, by part II of Proposition 1, the equilibrium fractions of consumers
µ and ﬁrms λ who enter the platform are given by the solution to equations (9) and (10).
The LHS of equation (10) describes the consumers gross expected utility, which, as claim 2 shows,
is increasing in λ. Also, the LHS of equation (9) denotes the ﬁrms’ gross expected proﬁts, which
are increasing in µ and decreasing in λ. Hence, if the platform increases the consumers’ charge
s, to sustain the equilibrium λ must increase and µ must also increase. As a result, if fees (a,s)
are such that both ﬁrms and consumers mix between participating and not participating then the
elasticity of consumer demand for participation is positive. Therefore, the platform will continue
10to increase the consumer fee till either all consumers join µ = 1, or all ﬁrms join λ = 1.
This result is somewhat surprising and we now explain how it relates to the externalities the two
groups of participants exert on one another. Along the equilibrium path, buyers are indiﬀerent
between joining the platform and staying out of the market. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the
subscription charge for the buyers s makes buyer participation less attractive. For consumers to
join the platform, ﬁrms should advertise in the platform more often, so that consumers can expect
to ﬁnd (on average) a better match. On the other hand, as retailers enter the platform more of-
ten they also face stronger competition. Hence, a higher ﬁrms’ participation rate would only be
consistent with the expectation that consumers also join the platform more often. Such positive
cross-group externalities which characterize the equilibrium under partial consumer and ﬁrm par-
ticipation, immediately imply that the proﬁts of the monopoly platform are strictly increasing in
the subscription fee s.
We then need to investigate two cases. First, consider that the case in which λ = 1 and µ ∈ (0,1).
Part II of Proposition 1 tells us that in this case µ is given by the solution to the zero-proﬁts




s.t. µp∗2 = ¯ εa,
where p∗ solves (3) and therefore does not depend on µ. The constraint of this problem tells
us that, given that µ < 1, if the intermediary increases the participation fee for the ﬁrms, then
consumers must subscribe to the intermediary with higher probability, which results in an increase
in intermediary’s proﬁts. Hence, the platform will continue to increase a till µ = 1.
Consider now the other case in which there is full consumer participation, µ = 1, and partial ﬁrm




s.t. Eu∗(S) ≥ 0.
Since the consumer demand for participation is inelastic, the intermediary has an incentive to
continue to increase its charge s till the constraint is binding, i.e. Eu∗(S) = 0. Using the expression

















































where λ solves condition (8).
We now claim that intermediary’s proﬁts are monotonically decreasing in a. To see this, note
that λ is decreasing in a. Hence, if a0 > a then λ(a0) < λ(a) and therefore B(·|λ(a),N) ﬁrst
order stochastically dominates B(·|λ(a0),N). Since
 
1 − F(p∗)k
E[zk|zk ≥ p∗] is increasing in k, it















Moreover, if a increases, the price charged by ﬁrms increases (because λ decreases) and this de-
creases the proﬁts of the intermediary, ceteris paribus. Overall, by increasing advertising fees the
intermediary’s proﬁts fall. Hence, the platform will continue to lower its advertising fee a up to the
point where all ﬁrms participate with probability one.
Proposition 2 In the monopoly platform model with diﬀerentiated product sellers the unique out-
come which can be sustained as a SPE takes the following form: The monopolist sets an entry fee
for the ﬁrms equal to
a∗ = p∗2/ε,




(ε − p∗ − a).











and obtain zero expected proﬁts. Consumers subscribe to the intermediary with probability 1 and
obtain zero expected utility. In subgame perfect equilibrium, the monopoly platform obtains a proﬁt
Π = N
N+1(Na + ε − p∗).
We now discuss two aspects of Proposition 2. First, we note that the equilibrium outcome is
constraint eﬃcient in the sense that the monopolist intermediary does not introduce any distortion
over and above the one caused by the market power of the diﬀerentiated product sellers. The
reason for this is that the monopolist can eﬃciently internalize the externalities between buyers
and sellers by decreasing the ﬁrms’ fee and increasing the consumers’ charge, which maximizes
agent participation and thus the welfare created within the platform.8
Second, in our framework the value a consumer derives from joining the platform is equal to the
expected value of the best match he can ﬁnd in the platform. Even though this value, which equals
¯ εN/N +1, is increasing in the number of retailers N and in the degree of product diﬀerentiation ¯ ε,
the way platform’s prices react to changes in these parameters diﬀer from one another. In particular,
as the number of retailers in the platform goes up, prices go down due to the competition eﬀects
so consumer gains not only because more products are available at the platform but also because
products are oﬀered at lower prices. As a result, the platform’s manager lowers ﬁrm fees and raises
consumer charges. Asymptotically, as the number of retailers tends to inﬁnity, the market becomes
perfectly competitive, ﬁrms price at marginal cost, and every consumer always ﬁnds her “ideal”
product. In this extreme case, ﬁrms are granted free access to the platform and the bulk of the
proﬁts of the intermediary is made from charging the consumers.
In contrast, an increase in product diﬀerentiation softens ﬁrm competition within the platform so
prices go up. Notice from Proposition 2 that when the product diﬀerentiation parameter increases
then prices increase in such a way that the ratio p∗/ε is constant. Hence, inspection of the platform’s
pricing strategy reveals that ﬁrms’ fee increases and consumers’ charge also increases.
8In the models of Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003), by contrast, the market outcome is not eﬃcient
because of agent heterogeneity. Here it is not eﬃcient because of the market power of the agents in one side of the
market. When N → ∞, ﬁrm pricing becomes competitive and the market allocation is eﬃcient.
134 Extensions
In the previous section we have analyzed a market that was completely intermediated in the sense
that transactions could not occur without the intermediary’s mediation. In this section we relax
this assumption by allowing consumers and ﬁrms to meet outside the platform and trade if they
wish so. When decentralized and centralized trade can coexist, the question that arises is whether
ﬁrms can price discriminate across channels or not. For convenience, we ﬁrst study a model in
which price discrimination is possible. This case is simpler and serves to illustrate the eﬀect of the
new outside option (decentralized trade) the players have. Then we discuss the case in which price
discrimination is not possible.
4.1 Decentralized trade and price discrimination
Consider the same model as in Section 2 with the modiﬁcation that ﬁrms and consumers have
an opportunity to trade outside the platform. We model this idea in a similar way as in Baye
and Morgan (2001). A consumer can subscribe to the intermediary or trade outside the platform;
likewise, a ﬁrm can advertise its product in the platform or not. A ﬁrm that advertises in the
platform charges a price which we denote as before, p∗. The ﬁrm charges a (diﬀerent) price,
denoted po, to the consumers who show up at the shop directly. So, we are allowing the ﬁrms to
price discriminate here: a ﬁrm that advertises its product in the platform sells at a price p∗ to the
subscribing consumers while it charges a price po to the non-subscribing consumers. Consumers
who subscribe to the intermediary see all the products available at the price p∗ and choose the one
that matches them best. When they don’t subscribe to the intermediary they pick one retailer at
random and buy at the price po.9 Finally, and for simplicity, we also assume that a consumer who
enters the intermediary cannot trade outside the platform within the current trading period, even
if he ﬁnds no suitable product in the platform.
Let us start with the continuation game equilibria. Let µ be the fraction of consumers subscribing to
the intermediary. Let λ be the probability a rival ﬁrm is advertising its product in the intermediary’s
platform. Consider the behavior of a ﬁrm i that does not advertise in the intermediary. The optimal




Pr[εi − po ≥ 0]po,
9The assumption that a consumer only samples one ﬁrm picks the idea that each consumer has a local ﬁrm to
buy from (cf. Baye and Morgan, 2001), or that searching outside the platform is very costly.
14and therefore po = ¯ ε/2 (the monopoly price). The expected proﬁts to a ﬁrm i when it does not
subscribe to the intermediary is Eπ∗(po,NA) =
¯ ε(1−µ)
4N .
Consider now a ﬁrm i that advertises its product in the intermediary, at a price pi (6= p∗). The









λk(1 − λ)N−1−k Pr[εi − pi ≥ max{0,zk − p∗}
#
+
+ µpi(1 − λ)N−1 Pr[εi − pi ≥ 0] + Eπi(po,NA;s−i) − a.
This expression is equivalent to the expression (1) in Section 3, with the exception that now we have
a new term, namely Eπi(po,NA;s−i). This new term appears because a ﬁrm that advertises in the
intermediary also receives a share of the consumers who do not subscribe and buy directly from
their local ﬁrms. Since ﬁrms price discriminate, this new term does not depend on pi and therefore
the equilibrium price p∗ within the platform is the same as in (3), which is decreasing in λ (see
claim 1). From the analysis above, it is clear that the expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm that advertises its
product in the intermediary’s platform can then be written as Eπ∗(p∗,A) =
µp∗2
¯ ε +Eπ∗(po,NA)−a,
and it is readily seen that, as in the benchmark model, this expected payoﬀ is decreasing in λ.
We now look at the behavior of consumers. The expected utility of a consumer who does not enter
the intermediary is simply Eu∗(NS) = Pr[ε − po ≥ 0]E[ε − po|ε ≥ po] = ¯ ε/8. Consider now the
expected utility of a consumer who subscribes to the intermediary. Notice that such a consumer
encounters himself exactly in the same position as in the previous analysis. Therefore, his utility
is Eu∗(S) =
PN
k=0 B(k|λ,N)E[uk] − s and recall that claim 2 shows that Eu∗(S) increases in λ.
We now turn to the intermediary’s problem, which has proﬁts Π = Nλa + µs. Here we can follow
the steps developed in the benchmark model to show that in the subgame perfect equilibrium the
intermediary will set the fees so that both ﬁrms and consumers fully participate. Suppose not and
consider that both types of agents mix between participating and not participating. Then, since
it must be the case that Eπ∗(p∗,A) = Eπ∗(po,NA) and Eu∗(S) = Eu∗(NS), we have a = µp∗2/¯ ε
and s =
PN
k=0 B(k|λ,N)E[uk] − ¯ ε/8. Note that these equations are the same as in Proposition
1 except in that now the consumer fee s is lowered by ¯ ε/8 to compensate buyers for the utility
they can obtain using their outside option. Then, as in the benchmark model, the monopolist
intermediary has an incentive to continue to increase the consumer charge s so that both ﬁrm
and consumer participation rates increase. Therefore, Proposition 2 also holds here, with the only
15modiﬁcation that the consumer fee s∗ = N
N+1(¯ ε − p∗ − a) − ¯ ε/8 so that consumers appropriate
part of the economic surplus, in particular Eu∗(S) = ¯ ε/8. The proﬁts of the monopoly platform
are then Π = N
N+1(Na + ¯ ε − p∗) − ¯ ε/8, lower than before by the amount left for consumers. The
equilibrium is also constraint eﬃcient.
4.2 Decentralized trade in the absence of price discrimination
We now consider the same model as above but assume that ﬁrms cannot price discriminate. That
is, we assume that a ﬁrm i that advertises its product at a price pi in the intermediary’s platform
also charges this price to the consumers who do not subscribe to the intermediary and happen to
visit ﬁrm i to conduct a transaction.
We start again with the continuation game equilibria. As before let λ and µ be the participation
rates of ﬁrms and consumers. Consider the behavior of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst remark is that the optimal
price of a ﬁrm that does not subscribe to the intermediary is po = ¯ ε/2, obtaining an expected proﬁt
equal to Eπ∗(po,NA) = ¯ ε(1−µ)/4N. Note that this proﬁt decreases as consumers’ subscribe more
frequently with the intermediary.
Suppose now that a ﬁrm enters the intermediary and charges a price pi, while all other ﬁrms in the









λk(1 − λ)N−1−k Pr[εi − pi ≥ max{0,zk − p∗}]
#
+
+ µpi Pr(εi ≥ pi)(1 − λ)N−1 +
1 − µ
N
Pr(εi ≥ pi)pi − a.









(1 − F(pi))pi − a.
Taking the ﬁrst order condition with respect to pi, using the uniform distribution and applying
symmetry, pi = p∗, we obtain that p∗ is the solution to
p∗ =
¯ ε












+ λ(1 − µ)
#
. (12)
Similarly to the model in section 2, an increase in λ fosters competition between ﬁrms within the
platform and price decreases. Note that what is new in this equation compared to the simpler cases
discussed before (equation (3)) is that now p∗ depends explicitly on µ. In fact, p∗ is decreasing in
16the consumers’ participation rate µ. When µ → 0, ﬁrms only sell locally and charge the monopoly
price. As µ increases the incentives to undercut the rival ﬁrms go up and the price decreases. When
µ → 1, equation (12) is equivalent to equation (3). As we will see later, this dependency of the
price p∗ on µ makes things diﬃcult because it is no longer straightforward to see that when the
monopolist intermediary increases the consumer fee s then both λ and µ increase. In this case, the











We now study the behavior of consumers. Consider a consumer who does not subscribe with the
intermediary. This consumer picks a ﬁrm, visits this ﬁrm and decides whether to buy there or not.
The chosen ﬁrm may be advertising its product at the intermediary’s platform (probability λ) or
not. Therefore, the expected utility of a consumer who does not enter the intermediary is:
Eu∗(NS) =
λ(¯ ε − p∗)2
2¯ ε
+
¯ ε(1 − λ)
8
,
which increases in λ due to the increase in competition in the platform.
Consider now a consumer who subscribes to the intermediary. As usual, we can write out his
expected utility as Eu∗(S) =
PN
k=0 B(k|λ,N)E[uk] − s, with E[uk] deﬁned as in (6). Armed with
these equations, it is straightforward to extend Proposition 1 describing the continuation game
equilibria to this situation where ﬁrms and consumers can trade on their own and ﬁrms cannot
price discriminate.
More interesting is the ﬁrst stage of the game, where the intermediary chooses subscription and
advertising fees. Here we also argue that an equilibrium must have all consumers and ﬁrms par-
ticipating surely. However, to support this claim we rely on numerical computations. By contra-
diction, suppose that µ ∈ (0,1) and λ ∈ (0,1) in equilibrium so neither ﬁrms nor consumers
participate with probability one. Then, as in the benchmark case, it must be the case that
a = Eπ∗(p∗,A) − Eπ∗(po,NA), while s = Eu∗(S) − Eu∗(NS). The proﬁt of the intermediary
is then:
Π = Nλa + µs = Nλ[Eπ∗(p∗,A) − Eπ∗(po,NA)] + µ[Eu∗(S) − Eu∗(NS)].
Suppose the monopolist intermediary increases its consumer fee s. To sustain the equilibrium, the
diﬀerence between the expected utility of a subscriber and the expected utility of a non-subscriber
17has to go up, therefore λ must increase. Indeed, an increase in λ increases the utility of both
subscribers and non-subscribers, but it increases the utility of the former more than that of the
latter. The reason is that a subscriber beneﬁts not only from the price decrease driven by the
increase in competition within the platform but also from an increase in the expected quality of
the match since now there are more products in the platform. The complication that arises is that
as λ goes up and the price goes down, ﬁrms are no longer indiﬀerent between participating and not
participating. In fact, the beneﬁts from ﬁrm participation go down relative to non-participation.
As a result, to restore equilibrium, µ must go up thereby increasing the gains from participating
and lowering the gains from non-participating. An increase in µ however feeds back into prices (see
expression (12)) again and therefore it is diﬃcult to characterize the adjustment process in this
case analytically.
a s p∗ λ µ Eπ∗(p∗,A) Eu∗(S) EΠ
0.010 0.010 0.497 0.596 0.0471 0.119 0.126 0.0124
0.010 0.050 0.495 0.803 0.0502 0.118 0.127 0.0186
0.010 0.070 0.494 0.913 0.0521 0.118 0.128 0.0219
0.010 0.085 0.493 1.000 0.0537 0.118 0.128 0.0245
0.050 0.085 0.471 0.967 0.2712 0.091 0.139 0.1197
0.100 0.085 0.450 0.936 0.5472 0.056 0.150 0.2337
0.150 0.085 0.434 0.913 0.8256 0.022 0.157 0.3440
0.150 0.100 0.424 0.987 0.8601 0.017 0.165 0.3822
0.170 0.100 0.418 0.978 0.9770 0.003 0.168 0.4302
0.171 0.104 0.414 1.000 1.0000 0.000 0.172 0.4477
Table 1: Model with centralized and decentralized trade, no price discrimination.
To shed further light on this we resort to numerical simulations of the model. Let us set N = 2 and
ε = 1. In Table 1 we report the equilibrium price, the participation rates of consumers and ﬁrms
as well as the proﬁts of the diﬀerent agents, including intermediary’s proﬁts, for diﬀerent values of
consumer and subscription fees. Notice that keeping a ﬁxed, an increase in s lowers equilibrium price
and increases both consumer and ﬁrm participation. As a result, the intermediary will continue to
increase s till either λ = 1 or µ = 1. When λ = 1, the Table shows how an increase in the ﬁrms
fee increases consumers participation, lowers the price and reduces ﬁrm participation. Proﬁts of
the intermediary increase anyway because consumer demand for participation is more elastic than
ﬁrm demand for participation. Since an increase in a decreases ﬁrm participation, this relaxes the
λ = 1 constraint and then the intermediaty can increase again the consumer fee. And so on and so
forth till the intermediary extracts all the rents in the market except the amount it has to leave for
18the consumers to compensate them for their outside option. In the SPE of this example we have:
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This paper has examined a two-sided market where a platform attracts retailers selling horizontally
diﬀerentiated products and buyers interested in acquiring one of those products. Firms which enter
the platform announce their products and their prices. Consumers who participate in the platform
receive product and price information and choose the product oﬀering them the highest utility. The
explicit modelling of intra-platform interaction has been the focus of the paper.
In the unique SPE outcome of the game, the platform fully internalizes the network externalities
present in the market and the market allocation is constraint eﬃcient. That is, the monopoly
platform does not introduce distortions over and above those arising from the market power of the
diﬀerentiated product sellers. When the platform is the only means for buyers and ﬁrms to get in
contact, the monopolist intermediary extracts all the economic rents generated in the market. If
ﬁrms and consumers can trade outside the platform, then consumers capture a part of the rents
corresponding to the option value of trading outside the platform. An increase in the number of
retailers increases the extent of variety in the platform but at the same time increases competition.
Anticipating that the equilibrium price of the goods will fall, the platform lowers the fees paid by the
ﬁrms and raises the fees paid by the consumers. An increase in the extent of product diﬀerentiation
raises the value of the platform for the consumers and weakens competition. Overall, the platform
raises the participation fee charged to the consumers as well as the price ﬁrms must pay to enter
the platform. These are implications on the relation between platform fees and the nature of the
activity that takes place within the platform are testable and, to the best of our knowledge, have
not yet been investigated.
An interesting issue is how platform mediated markets compare to standard markets for diﬀerenti-
ated products. Our benchmark model shows that the two kinds of market are similar in that they
generate the same welfare levels. However, the allocation of rents diﬀers from market to market.
While the monopolist intermediary extracts all the rents in the single platform mediated market,
rents are distributed across consumers and ﬁrms in a standard market. When ﬁrms and consumers
19can trade on their own, then the distribution of rents in the platform mediated market is less skewed
with consumers obtaining part of the economic rents.
Appendix
Proof of Claim 1. We ﬁrst prove existence. Notice that the LHS of (3) increases monotonically
in p∗, and takes values on [0, ¯ ε/2]. The RHS of (3) is monotonically decreasing in p∗, going from a
value equal to ¯ ε[1 − (1 − λ)N]/λN to ¯ ε[1 − (1 − λ/2)N]/λN, the latter being strictly positive. It
is easy to check that ¯ ε/2 > ¯ ε[1 − (1 − λ/2)N]/λN for all λ and N.10 This concludes the ﬁrst part
of Claim 1. The second part of Claim 1 follows from the fact that the RHS of (3) is decreasing in
λ. When λ → 0, the RHS of (3) goes to ¯ ε − p so p∗ = ¯ ε/2. The derivative of the RHS of (3) with
respect to λ is:
¯ ε
h
Ny (1 − y)
N−1 + (1 − y)N − 1
i
λ2N2 ,
where we are using the notation y ≡ λ(1−p∗/¯ ε), with y ≤ 1. The sign of this derivative is equal to
the sign of (1−y)N+Ny (1 − y)
N−1−1. Therefore we need to show that 1 > (1−y)N+Ny (1 − y)
N−1
for all y and N. Since (1−y)N +Ny (1 − y)
N−1 is decreasing in N, we can safely set N = 2. Then
we have 1 > (1−y)2+2y (1 − y) = 1−y2, which is always true. Finally, note that λ → 1, the RHS







Proof of Claim 2. Using the convention that E[uk=0] = 0, we can rewrite the expected utility





We note that the derivative of E[uk] with respect to p equals to −(¯ εk − p∗k)/¯ εk, which is strictly
negative for all k > 0. Also note that for given p then E[uk+1] > E[uk] for all k > 0. Indeed, if k
increases then 1 − F(p)k increases and E[zk|zk ≥ p] also increases because the expected maximum
value increases with the number of draws.
Finally, note that B(·|λ,N) is a binomial distribution and it is well known that if λ0 > λ then
B(·|λ0,N) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates B(·|λ,N). Hence, since E[uk] is strictly increasing
in k, it follows that an increase in λ raises the expected utility of a consumer who participates,







Combining these observations, the result follows. 
10In fact, one needs to check that 1 − (1 − λ/2)
N − λN/2 < 0 for all λ and N, which is easy to prove.
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